Does Government health insurance reduce job lock and job push? by Barkowski, Scott
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does Government health insurance
reduce job lock and job push?
Scott Barkowski
Clemson University
27 January 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69079/
MPRA Paper No. 69079, posted 29 January 2016 16:58 UTC
Does Government Health Insurance Reduce Job Lock and
Job Push?
Scott Barkowski∗†
January, 2016
Abstract
I study job lock and job push, the twin phenomena believed to be caused by employment-
contingent health insurance (ECHI). Using variation in Medicaid eligibility among house-
hold members of male workers as a proxy for shifts in workers dependence on employment
for health insurance, I estimate large job lock and job push effects. For married workers,
Medicaid eligibility for one household member results in an increase in the likelihood of
a voluntary job exit over a four-month period by approximately 34%. For job push, the
transition rate into jobs with ECHI among all workers falls on average by 26%.
Keywords: Job Lock; Job Push; Medicaid; Job Mobility
JEL categories: J6; I13
Copyright 2016 by Scott Barkowski. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including copyright notice, is given to the source.
∗The John E. Walker Department of Economics, Clemson University, 238 Sirrine Hall, Clemson, SC 29634,
sbarkow@clemson.edu; (864) 656-1892. The substantial bulk of the work on this paper was performed while the
author was a doctoral student in the Department of Economics at the University of California, Irvine.
†I am grateful for helpful comments on this draft from Marianne Bitler, Colin Cameron, Linda Cohen, Tom
Lam, Dan Miller, David Neumark, Jaqueline Oliveira, Joanne Song, Student Poster Session participants at the
2013 All-California Labor Conference, Session participants at the 2014 Southern Economic Association Annual
Meetings, and seminar participants at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality-CFACT, Analysis Group-
Los Angeles, the Census Bureau-CES LEHD, Clemson University-Economics, Emory University-Economics,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency-CRAD, Precision Health Economics, RTI International-Health
Care Financing and Payment Program, and UC Irvine-Economics. Additionally, I am particularly thankful to
Jonathan Gruber and Aaron Yelowitz for making their Medicaid eligibility imputation programs available. All
errors are, of course, mine.
1
1 Introduction
The American health insurance market shares a close association with the country’s labor
market, a link made evident by the fact that in 2010, 78% of full-time, year-round workers
bought health insurance through an employer (Brault and Blumenthal, 2011, Table 1). The
main reason for this link is that employment-contingent health insurance (ECHI) is generally
provided at much lower cost than insurance coverage available through alternative sources like
the individual market. This lower cost is a result of factors such as tax incentives for both the
employer and the employee, reduced administrative costs for groups, and reduced incidence of
adverse selection (Gruber, 2000). The benefits of employer provision of insurance come at a
cost, though, as access to this lower cost insurance is usually limited to firm employees and
their immediate families.
Such restrictions on access could have important implications on the frequency that workers
enter and exit jobs. For workers with ECHI, non-portability of coverage implies costs that must
be incurred by the worker when leaving an employer. These costs could be relatively small,
such as losing access to certain physicians under a new insurance plan, or large, as when a
health condition delays or prevents the worker from obtaining coverage. To avoid these costs,
an employee may choose to stay in a job he or she would otherwise leave, a phenomenon referred
to as “job lock”. On the other hand, when a person does not have ECHI, whether in a job
or not, the higher cost of obtaining insurance through other sources will provide an incentive
to find a job that provides access to ECHI. When such a person chooses to take a job that he
or she would otherwise not in order to gain access to health insurance, it is called “job push”
(Cooper and Monheit, 1993; Anderson, 1997; Hamersma and Kim, 2009). In either case, job
lock or job push, the underlying mechanism is the same: the relationship between employment
and insurance increases the value of jobs offering access to health insurance relative to other
employment states.
Understanding the role ECHI plays in the operation of the labor market has taken a renewed
importance in recent years with the debate over, and eventual passage of, the Affordable Care
Act in 2010. Before the law was adopted in 2009, supporters of the law argued that the reduction
of job lock was one mechanism through which the law would improve the economy (e.g., Council
of Economic Advisors, 2009; Gruber, 2009). However, there has been little consensus in the
literature regarding the prevalence of job mobility effects of ECHI. Empirical studies have
estimated effect sizes ranging from large (e.g., Cooper and Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994;
Gruber and Madrian, 1994; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996), to moderate but only affecting
certain sub-populations (e.g., Gilleskie and Lutz, 2002; Hamersma and Kim, 2009), to small
or non-existent (Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Kapur, 1997; Berger et al., 2004). Moreover, Sanz-De-
Galdeano (2006) found that a previous law intended to alleviate job lock, the Health Insurance
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Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, had no effect.
The goal of this paper is to contribute to this debate regarding the existence of job lock
and job push in the American labor market. Using individual-level panel data from the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), I estimate job mobility effects for men that
are identified via variation in eligibility of household members for Medicaid, the state and
federal government provided health insurance program. Medicaid provides a source of portable
insurance coverage, so its availability to household members of a worker represents a reduction
in the cost of leaving an employer for those who hold ECHI. We would, therefore, expect workers
to be more likely to leave their jobs when they themselves, or their household members, are
eligible for Medicaid coverage. Conversely, for individuals without ECHI, Medicaid eligibility
for household members makes their current state of employment more attractive relative to job
options that offer ECHI, so one would expect these people to be less likely to move into such jobs.
Medicaid eligibility, rather than outright Medicaid enrollment, is used since eligible individuals
always have the option to enroll in the program after becoming sick without exclusions. Thus,
eligibility is the same as actual enrollment, as far as behavior that is affected by insurance
coverage is concerned (Cutler and Gruber, 1996; Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999).
This approach of relying on Medicaid to study job lock is possible because of a large ex-
pansion of the Medicaid program during the period I study, the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This expansion took place among children and pregnant women, the result of an effort by the
government to reduce the number of kids without health insurance. As Table 1 shows, from
1986 to 1993 the share of children in the USA under 21 who were eligible for Medicaid expanded
from 21% to 38%. For women, pregnancy eligibility rose from 11% to 25%. The implication
of this was that many working class people became eligible, something which had previously
been restricted primarily to individuals who did not work, thereby making Medicaid relevant
for studying labor market issues like job lock.
The use of Medicaid as a basis for identification requires care, however, since individual-
level behavior plays a critical role in eligibility, and because measurement of eligibility in the
first place is difficult. My empirical approach, therefore, employs three main strategies to
compensate for these issues, with the first being a difference-in-differences (DD) regression
framework for estimation. In this strategy, which is in the same spirit as Madrian (1994),
individuals who have insurance through alternative sources that are not their employers, such
as through spouse employers, are used in control groups. For these individuals, Medicaid
eligibility represents a redundant source of health insurance, rendering it a placebo. This is
intended to address the possibility that Medicaid eligibility is correlated with unobserved factors
that influence the propensity to move between jobs, but are unrelated to worker concerns over
health insurance. For example, people who are prone to move frequently between jobs may
never develop industry- or firm-specific human capital, and therefore be more likely to be
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eligible for Medicaid. This approach, however, relies on these unobserved propensities being
similar across individuals with or without alternative sources of insurance (i.e. across the
treatment and control groups). This may not be true given that health insurance source is
chosen by the individual. Therefore, in my second strategy, I augment the DD model with
individual-level fixed effects (a first in the job lock literature) to help address any differences in
the distribution of unobserved job transition propensities between the treatment and control
groups. Additionally, they also strengthen my model’s ability to address the endogeneity of
Medicaid eligibility in finer way than the DD approach alone would. In my third primary
strategy, I address the possibilities that individual-level Medicaid eligibility may be correlated
with unobserved, time-varying factors, and that it may be measured with error – a particular
concern due to the use of fixed effects. To do so, I replace Medicaid eligibility measured at the
individual-level with a state-level measure of the likelihood of being eligible during the same
period for people in the same state, education, and age categories (which are all characteristics
that are relatively better measured).
Using this empirical framework, I find evidence of both job lock and job push for men that
are substantial in size when considered in proportion to population rates of mobility. For job
lock, I estimate that Medicaid eligibility for one additional household member of a married
male worker increases his probability of leaving his job voluntarily over a four-month period by
approximately 34%, as compared to if the household member were dependent on the worker’s
ECHI for coverage. For job push, I estimate that eligibility versus no coverage at all for a
household member results in a 26% lower likelihood of transitioning into a job with ECHI over
four months (based on a sample of married and unmarried workers).
This paper is part of a burst of research on the effects of Medicaid on job lock and job push
which resulted in a small set of papers emerging publicly at nearly the same time. Baicker et al.
(2014) studies the effects of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment on employment, finding
no effect. Dave et al. (2013) studies the same Medicaid expansion as this paper, but focuses
on labor supply as a means to estimate health insurance crowd-out among pregnant women.
Their analysis implies large eligibility effects. Garthwaite et al. (2014) finds moderately sized
labor supply effects in response to a Medicaid dis-enrollment in Tennessee. The advantage of
this paper over these others is that I use an individual-level panel data set that allows for much
more precise measurement of health insurance coverage and Medicaid eligibility, and allows for
the relevant job lock and job push populations to be precisely identified. This approach allows
me to limit several sources of bias that the other authors are unable to address. Additionally,
I use the data’s detail about households to focus on the expansion’s effect on male workers via
coverage of worker household members. This is an important channel for Medicaid to influence
the labor market that is not studied by the other authors.
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2 Medicaid during the late 1980s and early 1990s
Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that provides health care insurance coverage for
poor children and their parents, poor pregnant women, and poor elderly and disabled.1 Each
state administers its own Medicaid program and sets its own eligibility rules that are subject
to federal requirements. It covers a broad range of medical services with little or no cost to the
beneficiary, making its coverage valuable to the covered individual.
Before 1984, Medicaid was only available to non-elderly, non-disabled individuals if they
participated in the federal cash welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).2 During this time period, AFDC provided income to very poor families with a primary
goal of supporting children lacking parental support. Eligibility rules for AFDC were quite
restrictive, though, admitting only some family composition types in addition to requiring low
incomes. For example, childless adults and, in many states, two-parent families with children
were ineligible. As a result, eligible families were nearly entirely headed by single women who
did not work. In 1984, 90% of AFDC families were headed by single mothers, fewer than 5% of
participating mothers worked, and 88% of participating families had no income at all outside
of AFDC (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1987, p. 432).
Medicaid’s link to AFDC combined with the restrictiveness of AFDC eligibility resulted
in a large number of low-income families being excluded from Medicaid. This feature of the
Medicaid program drew attention from Congress, which feared that children were going without
health care since their families could not afford their own insurance coverage. Beginning in 1984
and continuing into the 1990’s, Congress addressed the issue by passing a series of federal level
laws that gradually reduced the link between AFDC and Medicaid, resulting in the expansion of
Medicaid eligibility to historically excluded segments of the population. In particular, families
with much higher income levels than before became eligible, including many headed by adults
in the working ranks.
Given the government’s goal of increasing insurance coverage for children, the expansions
were designed to either directly make kids Medicaid eligible, or to indirectly cover them by
providing coverage of pregnancy care for women (that is, only pre-natal care and birth related
expenses were covered for women, not general health care when not pregnant). Men, therefore,
were generally not eligible for Medicaid themselves.3 However, men did still receive indirect
1The discussion in this section relies heavily on a number of sources, each of which contributed important
facts, concepts, and background information throughout. To avoid distracting the reader with numerous cita-
tions, I acknowledge these works here except to note a source when specific statistics are mentioned: Committee
on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (1987); Congressional Research Service (1988, 1993); Currie
and Gruber (1996a,b); Cutler and Gruber (1996); Gruber (2003); Gruber and Yelowitz (1999); Yelowitz (1995).
2The elderly and disabled were eligible for Medicaid if they were eligible for the federal cash welfare program,
Supplemental Security Income.
3Men could be directly covered via eligibility for AFDC, which primarily covered women but did cover
some men such as the case of a poor, single father. Eligibility of AFDC did expand during this period, but
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benefits from the expansion since their children or spouses could be covered (or any female
adult family members, whether spouses or not).
The implementation of the expansion took place via a number of different eligibility rule
changes. Eligibility age limits for children were increased, family income thresholds were raised,
and family composition restrictions were eased. These changes were effected in a varied fashion,
with federal law at times imposing nationwide requirements, and at others giving states the
option to expand eligibility requirements. These optional expansions were then, in some cases,
later made requirements. As a result, Medicaid eligibility expanded over time and did so at
different rates across states.
3 Identifying job mobility effects
Before proceeding with the discussion of identifying job mobility effects, it would be useful to
note that I estimate models that explicitly account for insurance status of multiple members of
a given household, even though it is only one member of the household whose job mobility is
modeled in any particular regression. To avoid ambiguity, I refer the individual whose mobility
is being modeled (that is, the individual to whom the outcome variables refer) as “the worker”,
and use “household members” to refer to individuals living with the worker at the time of his
inclusion in my analysis. I allude to individuals or people in the household when referencing
the combination of the worker and household members without making distinctions between
them. Additionally, it should be emphasized here that the term “ECHI” always refers to health
insurance coverage that is provided by the worker’s employer, and not by that of any household
member. Finally, note that since I only analyze job mobility of male workers in this paper, the
workers are always men, but their household members could be male or female.
3.1 Job lock
The dependent variable of interest in my job lock analysis, Yit, equals one if worker i reported
a voluntary exit, either a quit or a retirement, from his job during period t, and zero otherwise.
The goal of the analysis is to estimate λ, the effect of the link between health insurance and
employment on Yit:
λ ≡E[Yit|i not dependent on employment for health insurance during t]
−E[Yit|i dependent on employment for health insurance during t]. (3.1)
its magnitude was very small compared to the expansion of eligibility for women beyond AFDC (Cutler and
Gruber, 1996). Men could also be eligible for Medicaid as a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a
federal welfare program for poor elderly, blind, and disabled. However, those individuals are excluded from my
analysis.
6
A positive value for λ indicates that voluntary job exits are more frequent when workers are
not dependent on their jobs for health insurance. That is, a positive estimate of λ would be
evidence consistent with job lock.
To estimate λ, I start by restricting my SIPP sample to include only male workers from
households in which all members are covered by an employer-provided health insurance plan.
This step is necessary to be able to differentiate job lock from job push; workers in households
where everyone is covered by insurance from an employer have no incentive to seek alternative
employment in order to gain employer-provided coverage (which would be job push, not job
lock). Without this restriction, the sign of the theoretical effect of ECHI is ambiguous. Consider
the example of a worker with a spouse, whose job provides coverage for the worker himself only.
I might assume that the worker is dependent on his job for insurance and hence less likely
to leave his job. However, this may not be the case – the worker may seek another job that
provides coverage for both himself and his spouse, and so he would be more likely to leave his
job. So by conditioning on ECHI coverage for the entire household, I omit individuals who are
more likely to be influenced by job push rather than job lock.
Having so restricted the data, I rely on Medicaid eligibility to provide variation in worker
ECHI dependence. Medicaid is a source of health insurance that is not contingent on em-
ployment and, due to the expansions of the program during the time period studied, common
among the working population. Eligibility, rather than explicit enrollment, is used because it
implies coverage due to the fact that eligible individuals always have the option to enroll even
after becoming sick (or pregnant, in the case of women). Cutler and Gruber (1996, p. 392)
called this aspect of Medicaid eligibility “conditional coverage”. I therefore base identification
on the comparison of workers with Medicaid eligible household members to those with inel-
igible household members. While Medicaid was not a direct replacement for most employer
provided plans, for the eligible its availability did reduce the potential costs associated with
choosing to leave a job, since the workers’ household members would not be completely without
health insurance. For those with household members who were not eligible, leaving a job still
implied that access to health insurance would be limited. Thus, if job mobility is truly affected
by ECHI, we would expect to observe different mobility rates between those with household
members who were eligible and not eligible for Medicaid.
To account for the fact that individuals with and without Medicaid eligibility differ in
important observed and unobserved ways, I implement an expanded version of the difference-
in-differences (DD) framework applied by previous authors (e.g., Madrian, 1994; Holtz-Eakin,
1994; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996). My model of voluntary job terminations takes the
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following form:
Yi(t+1) = β1
(
Jit∑
j=1
Eitj
)
+ β2
(
Jit∑
j=1
Mitj
)
+ β3
(
Jit∑
j=1
EitjNitj
)
+ β4
(
Jit∑
j=1
EitjMitj
)
+ β5
(
Jit∑
j=1
EitjNitjMitj
)
+X ′itγ + uit. (3.2)
In equation 3.2, i and t identify the worker and time period, respectively, while j indexes the Jit
individuals in i’s household during period t. The worker himself is included in the j index, so
everyone in i’s household plays a role determining his job mobility in this model. The insurance
coverage variables, Eitj, Nitj, and Mitj, each identify coverage during period t for the j
th person
in worker i’s household by taking a value of one, and the lack of coverage by taking a value of
zero. Eitj indicates ECHI coverage through worker i’s employer during period t. Nitj indicates
insurance from a source that is not worker i’s employer and not Medicaid. I refer to this type of
coverage as “non-ECHI”, since this insurance is not contingent on the worker’s employer. That
said, this type of insurance can come from a household member’s employer – just not worker
i’s. Mitj identifies individuals who are Medicaid eligible (including those explicitly enrolled in
Medicaid). Finally, Xit is a vector of other controls and uit is the unobserved error term.
It is worth highlighting that the key factor affecting whether a particular insurance plan is
indicated by Eitj or Nitj is whether it comes from worker i’s employer or not. For example,
consider a household consisting of a husband and wife. Suppose both work and each have
insurance coverage through their own employers that cover themselves only, not their spouses,
and that neither spouse has any other source of health insurance. For my analysis, the husband
is the worker with index j = 1 and his wife has j = 2. Since he only has insurance through his
employer, his status variables are then Eit1 = 1, Nit1 = 0, and Mit1 = 0. His wife’s coverage
is indicated as Eit2 = 0, Nit2 = 1, and Mit2 = 0, since her only insurance is not through his
employer, even though it is through hers. Other combinations are possible, but all values are
assigned in this fashion.
To understand the rationale behind equation 3.2, consider a simpler version of the model,
which only involves the worker himself:4
Yi(t+1) = β1Eit + β2Mit + β3EitNit + β4EitMit + β5EitNitMit +X
′
itγ + uit. (3.3)
Here the j index is dropped since only the worker’s insurance status is considered. This model
could be interpreted as a standard triple-differences specification in which Nit and NitMit are
4For the purpose of explaining the rationale of the model, I leave aside the fact that men were typically not
eligible for Medicaid.
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excluded due to the restricted sample,5 but I argue that it is more appropriate to think of it
as a dual difference-in-differences specification, a point which is illustrated in Table 2. The
“treatment” group is composed of individuals who depended on their employers for insurance
access. That is, those with ECHI but without non-ECHI. For comparison, this specification
offers two potential “control” groups. The first contains individuals with both ECHI and non-
ECHI, while the second contains those without ECHI but with non-ECHI. In this framework,
Medicaid eligibility represents a treatment for individuals in the treatment group since it was
their only insurance besides ECHI. For both of the control groups, however, the members
already had insurance not related to their own employment, rendering Medicaid eligibility
redundant – and hence, a placebo – as far as job mobility is concerned.
As Table 2 shows, the availability of two control groups allows for the identification of the
job lock parameter, λ, via two separate DD rationales, given by
λ1 ≡ E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 0,Mit = 1]− E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 0,Mit = 0]
− (E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 1,Mit = 1]− E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 1,Mit = 0]) = −β5, (3.4)
and
λ2 ≡ E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 0,Mit = 1]− E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 0,Mit = 0]
− (E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 0, Nit = 1,Mit = 1]− E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 0, Nit = 1,Mit = 0]) = β4. (3.5)
Here the first lines of both equations are the same, showing that both methods are based
on the same core comparison: the difference between the averages for the Medicaid eligible
and ineligible individuals in the treatment group. The second lines of the two expressions are
both intended to remove job mobility effects of Medicaid eligibility that are not related to the
demand for ECHI, but do so using two different control groups. The first equation uses the
“preferred control” group (those with ECHI) and the second equation uses the “alternative
control” group (those without ECHI). Estimates for job lock using both identification methods
can be simultaneously obtained from a single regression using equation 3.3, where λˆ1 = −βˆ5
and λˆ2 = βˆ4. Thus a positive coefficient estimate for β4 and a negative estimate for β5 are
evidence consistent with job lock in this model.
From an experimental design perspective, λˆ1 is favored over λˆ2 because it is based on the
5In a standard triple-differences regression, three indicator variables divide the sample into eight sub-groups.
In my sample, though, there are only six sub-groups because of the restriction that the workers all lived in
households where everyone had insurance through an employer. This means that there are no individuals for
whom Eitj and Nitj both equal zero, and hence, that Eitj = 0 implies Nitj = 1 and, conversely, that Nitj = 0
implies Eitj = 1. As a result, variables Eitj , Nitj , and EitjNitj are collinear, as Eitj + Nitj − EitjNitj = 1.
I therefore drop Nitj and NitjMitj (
∑
j Nitj and
∑
j NitjMitj from the ultimate version of the model), since
keeping Eitj and EitjMitj makes interpretation of the results more straightforward.
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preferred control group in which individuals all have ECHI, as they do in the treatment group.
Workers in the alternative control group, on which λˆ2 is based, do not have ECHI – implying
an important difference from the treatment group members. From a practitioner’s viewpoint,
however, the ideal outcome would be for the estimators to produce similar estimates, especially
since sample sizes for the alternative control group are much larger than the preferred control
group. Thus, even though λˆ1 is expected to be more reliable, the estimates produced by λˆ2 are
still valuable for comparison with the λˆ1 estimates.
In appendix A, I carefully discuss the intuition and assumptions that link this simple version
of the model (equation 3.3) with the full, empirical model (equation 3.2). In short, the full model
is as if a separate dual DD for the worker and each of the household members were included in
the regression, and that corresponding term coefficients are assumed constant across household
members. That is, that every household member’s insurance coverage affects the outcome
variable in the same way.
Appendix A also shows that the interpretation of the parameters in the full model (equation
3.2) are analogous to the interpretation for the simple model (equation 3.3). That is, β4 and
−β5 represent the incremental change in job mobility from a person in the worker’s household
becoming less dependent on the worker’s ECHI for coverage. An important distinction that
should not be overlooked, though, is that since adult men were not generally able to be Medicaid
eligible, estimates of β4 and −β5 are identified based on workers’ responses to changes in the
Medicaid coverage of their household members. So job lock estimates obtained in my analysis
represent the incremental change in job mobility from a person – besides the worker himself –
in the worker’s household becoming less dependent on the worker’s ECHI for coverage.
3.2 Job push
The empirical strategy I rely on to detect job push is similar conceptually to the one I use
for job lock, but requires several important changes. The first difference is that the outcome
variable of interest is Zit in this analysis, an indicator for an individual moving into a job with
ECHI, regardless of whether it was from another job or from non-employment. If a worker
moves to an ECHI job (after voluntarily leaving his previous job, if the transition is between
jobs), then Zit equals one, otherwise it is zero. Given this outcome, I can define the job push
parameter of interest,
pi ≡E[Zit|i seeks employer provided health insurance during t]
−E[Zit|i does not seek employer provided health insurance during t]. (3.6)
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A positive value of pi means that individuals seeking employer health insurance are more likely
to transition from their current states into jobs offering ECHI. Thus, positive estimates of pi
constitute evidence of job push.
The requirement that the individual moves to a job with ECHI has not been used by most
authors studying job push. Anderson (1997) and Hamersma and Kim (2009) studied job exits
without specifying anything about where the workers went, while Cooper and Monheit (1993)
studied job changes for those predicted to gain health insurance if they switched jobs. Only
Dave et al. (2013) and Garthwaite et al. (2014), besides this current study, include analyses
of moves into jobs with ECHI (though in these studies the moves are implicit, since they do
not observe individuals over time). The requirement that the new job has ECHI, though, is
an important step to avoid bias since movement into jobs without ECHI is inconsistent with
insurance seeking behavior. Appendix B shows formally that bias is introduced by the use
of a dependent variable that combines both moves into jobs with ECHI and moves into those
without it, but this point can be understood intuitively when one recognizes that jobs with
ECHI and those without are substitutes when one seeks ECHI insurance. A worker seeking
ECHI is more likely to move to a job with ECHI than one without, and vice versa, and thus
job push has effects with opposite directions on these two types of job moves. Treating both
types of moves as the same, then, would result in effects potentially canceling each other out.6
Like my use of the jobs with ECHI outcome, my inclusion of the population of people moving
from non-employment into employment in my analyses is unusual for the job push literature,
though Dave et al. (2013) and Garthwaite et al. (2014) are again exceptions that study this
group implicitly. This population, though, should not be ignored since the mechanism behind
job push is that jobs with ECHI are more attractive than similar (or even better) jobs without
such insurance. This is true regardless of the individual’s state before making the transition
into a job. This point has been noted by previous authors with regards to job lock, as well
(e.g., Madrian, 1994; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Hamersma and Kim, 2009), and the
inclusion of the non-employed in studying job push is simply the analog to the job lock practice
of including voluntary job quits for any reason.
Another change in comparison to my job lock analysis is the manner in which I restrict the
SIPP data to obtain my estimation sample. As discussed in Section 3.1, for some individuals
6This reasoning suggests that treating both types of job moves as the same introduces negative bias. All
of the other papers studying Medicaid influences on job push are affected by this to some degree. It provides
a possible explanation why Hamersma and Kim (2009) find relatively weak evidence of job push, and suggests
that the results of Dave et al. (2013) might understate the true effect. Baicker et al. (2014) find no employment
effect of Medicaid, but it is hard to evaluate the impact this issue would have on their analysis since they do
not make any attempt to separately identify job lock versus job push. Interestingly, Garthwaite et al. (2014)
perform analyses both ways, employment without restriction and with ECHI requirement, and find smaller
estimates when restricting to jobs with ECHI. They base their work on the Current Population Survey, though,
so are unable to precisely measure ECHI coverage and Medicaid eligibility. Thus, this unexpected result may
be due to other confounding effects related defining the relevant job push sample.
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there is theoretical ambiguity as to whether one should expect to observe job lock or job push.
In an effort to address this, I omit individuals that could potentially be affected by job lock,
leaving job push as the only potential effect. To be included in my job push sample, a worker
must not have held ECHI, or, if the worker did have ECHI from his own employer, then
everyone (including the worker) in his household must have been covered by employer provided
insurance originating from one or more employers of household members (not the worker’s
employer). Selecting the sample in this way limits the chance that job push and job lock would
be conflated since individuals without ECHI obviously could not be affected by job lock, and
if everybody in the family already had an alternative source of insurance that was high quality
and affordable (as would be expected since it was employer provided), then there is no reason
to think the workers needed to stay in their jobs out of insurance concerns.7
In the final change versus my job lock analysis, I redefine the ECHI and Medicaid status
variables to help maximize the symmetry between my job lock and job push analyses: let
E˜itj ≡ 1−Eitj and M˜itj ≡ 1−Mitj. These variables indicate when the individuals do not have
ECHI or Medicaid eligibility, respectively, and are used in the job push analogue of my job lock
model:
Zi(t+1) = δ1
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itj
)
+ δ2
(
Jit∑
j=1
M˜itj
)
+ δ3
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itjNitj
)
+ δ4
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itjM˜itj
)
+ δ5
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itjNitjM˜itj
)
+X ′itθ + εit. (3.7)
As in the job lock case, this model produces a set of two DD estimators: the preferred estimator,
pˆi1 = −δˆ5, and the alternative estimator, pˆi2 = δˆ4. The justification for interpreting this model
as a dual DD follows reasoning analogous to the job lock case, which is discussed in more detail
in Appendix C. Both estimators are based on a treatment group composed of individuals with
neither ECHI nor non-ECHI. Lack of Medicaid eligibility represents the treatment since those
without it are expected to seek jobs with health insurance access more frequently than those
who are eligible. The control group for the preferred estimator (pˆi1) is comprised of individuals
without ECHI, like the treatment group, but who do have non-ECHI. The alternative estimator
(pˆi2) is based on a control group comprised of individuals who differ from the treatment group on
two dimensions, having both ECHI and non-ECHI coverage. For both of these control groups,
Medicaid coverage is redundant because the individuals have non-ECHI, so eligibility would
7My strategy of using different data restrictions to differentiate job lock and job push is similar to that of
Hamersma and Kim (2009). Their samples were both more restrictive than mine since they split their samples
strictly on ECHI status. This is not a problem for their job push analysis, though their job lock regressions
may have been confounded by the presence of some individuals influenced by job push rather than job lock. As
shown by the example of the worker and spouse I gave in section 3.1, requiring all workers to have ECHI is not
sufficient to remove all possible influence of job push.
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not be expected to cause demand for ECHI to vary.
These estimators represent the incremental change in the likelihood of a worker moving to
a job with ECHI due to a decrease in demand for ECHI coverage (via the worker) for one
of the worker’s household members. Hence, like the job lock case, identification is primarily
based on Medicaid eligibility for the workers’ household members – not the workers themselves.
Unlike the lob lock case, however, sample size concerns favor the preferred estimator here, since
membership in the alternative control group requires both ECHI and non-ECHI coverage, and
is, hence, more restrictive.
3.3 Estimation
I depart from the bulk of the previous literature in basing estimation on the linear probability
model. Previous authors have used the probit model almost exclusively. This change affords me
the ability to consistently estimate models with individual-level fixed effects and state-by-year
dummies, neither of which have been used before in the literature. I view the individual-
level fixed effects to be of particular importance since they account for individuals’ unobserved
propensities to transition between employment states and jobs. These could cause inconsistency
if, for example, firm and industry specific skills and experience influence peoples’ wages and
abilities to get good jobs. Frequent transition behavior would therefore be correlated with lower
earnings and hence Medicaid eligibility. To some extent, this issue is already addressed by the
DD models described above since they are designed to address unobserved factors correlated
with eligibility. The fixed effects, though, would help address differences in the distribution of
these unobserved propensities across the treatment and control groups.
Previous authors were generally unable to use individual-level fixed effects for one of two
reasons. Either their analyses were based on identification strategies that had very little vari-
ation over time, or they studied narrow populations for which individual-level panel surveys
were not appropriate. My design, though, is particularly suited to the use of person-level fixed
effects because of the national Medicaid expansion, which created time-variation in eligibility
that was not based on changes in person level characteristics and which affected a broad popu-
lation. The Medicaid expansion, however, had an important state-by-time component, creating
a concern that it could have been correlated with state-specific time-trends in job mobility.
The inclusion of state-by-year dummy variables in some versions of my models are, therefore,
intended to address this issue.
All models are estimated via the Within Estimator.8 Other controls include dummies for
education, marital status, five-year age group, earnings decile, household income decile, firm
8All regression estimates including standard errors are implemented using Stata module “xtivreg2” (Baum
et al., 2010; Schaffer, 2010) via Stata/SE 12.1 for Windows (StataCorp, 2011).
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type, number of household members, and month-year. Indicators for having a child less than
two years old, between two and five, and between six and 17 are also included, and these child
dummies are fully interacted with each other. Descriptive statistics for all model dependent
variables and controls can be found in Table 4. All sample descriptive statistics and regression
estimates are weighted using panel weights from the SIPP longitudinal files.9
Two-way, cluster-robust standard errors are reported for all models (Cameron et al., 2011).
The use of two-way clustering is intended to address, at least in part, the problem of individuals
who move between states over the course of a panel. For example, consider the case of a man
who moves from California to South Carolina. Since he could be influenced by state-specific
factors in both states that are not accounted for explicitly, his error term could be correlated
with those of other Californians and South Carolinians both. This implies that clustering by
one state only, say California, is deficient, since no correlation with residents of South Carolina
is assumed. To implement two-way clustering to address this issue, I create two variables where
one equals California and the other South Carolina for each of the man’s observations in the
panel. More generally, for any worker moving between two states, one variable identifies the
first state of residence and the other identifies the second. Workers who do not move have both
variables equal to the same state where he or she lives. Both state variables are then used
as cluster-group variables in calculating the two-way-clustered standard errors. Appendix D
presents additional details about this approach.
4 Data
I perform my analysis using the 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, and 1991 panels of the SIPP (U.S. Dept.
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2006, n.d.), an individual-level, longitudinal survey. The
SIPP collected information on the resident population of the United States of America, exclud-
ing those who lived in military barracks or institutions. The panels each surveyed completely
separate samples of individuals which were designed to be nationally representative. Hence,
residents of all 50 states and the District of Columbia were surveyed, though Alaska, both
Dakotas, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Vermont, and Wyoming all were not separately identi-
9Since my analysis combines five SIPP panels (described in Section 4 below) which cover nearly eight full
years, I adjust the panel weights to account for growth in the American population over this period. I adjust
all panel weights such that for any particular wave, the sum of all panel weights in the pooled sample (before I
restrict the data) is equal to the country population used as the base for the 1990 panel weights. So if A is the
sum of the 1990 panel weights for any wave (all waves have the same sum), and Bp is the sum of the weights for a
given wave of panel p, then I multiply all the longitudinal weights for panel p by (A/Bp)×0.2. This adjustment
factor for each panel is: 0.20789744 for 86, 0.20607208 for 87, 0.20414484 for 88, 0.2 for 90, and 0.19590615
for 91. The effect of this adjustment is to increase the weight for the earlier panels since, in comparison to
individuals drawn in the 1990 panel, respondents in the earlier panels were more likely to be chosen to be panel
members (because the population was smaller during the time of those panels). The unadjusted panel weights
do not reflect this difference.
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fied in the data due to confidentiality concerns arising from their small populations. The SIPP
selected its survey subjects by choosing homes and interviewing the people who lived there.
Only individuals 15 years or older were eligible to be SIPP interviewees, though information
about household children was collected through the interviews of household adults. When re-
spondents moved to new addresses, the survey followed them (when possible) and continued to
include them in the survey.
Individuals were interviewed every four months over the life of the panels, with each four-
month-long subdivision known as a panel “wave”. Each panel’s sample was divided into four
interview rotation groups which were interviewed separately on a rotating basis over the four
months of a wave. This resulted in a survey schedule where every month during the span of
the panel one of the rotation groups was in the process of being interviewed. The interviews
are backwards looking, covering the four months immediately preceding the interview month.
For example, for the individuals interviewed in February 1987, their interviews cover the period
from October 1986 through January 1987, while respondents interviewed in May 1989 were
questioned about the period January to April of the same year. Due to this backward looking
design, for the people who remained in the survey over the entirety of the panel, it is possible
to assemble an observation for every month over the entire period of the survey. However, the
SIPP survey was not designed to track changes in an individual’s source of health insurance over
the course of a wave, and so I only use one observation per respondent, per wave, dropping all
observations except those from the month that immediately preceded the individual’s interview
month (i.e. the fourth month). This has the additional advantages of helping to minimize error
in the respondent’s recollection and avoid the so-called “seam bias” (Gruber and Madrian, 1997;
Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Callegaro, 2008).
Each panel followed respondents for at least two years. The 86 and 87 panels lasted seven
waves,10 while 88 lasted six, and 90 and 91 both lasted eight waves. The 1989 panel was not
included in my analysis since it only lasted three waves.11 Since a new panel started each year
during this time period, the length of the surveys implied panel “overlap”, meaning that waves
from more than one panel occurred at the same time. For example, the last four waves of the
87 panel all occurred at the same time as one of the first four waves of the 88 panel. After
combining all five panels, my data includes observations for every month from January 1986
through August of 1993.
I enforced a number of restrictions on the data to obtain my final analysis samples. Table 3
lists the impact of these restrictions on my sample sizes in detail. Only month four observations
10One of the rotation groups of the 1986 panel (i.e. a quarter of its entire sample) was only included in six
waves due to budget constraints.
11Both the 1988 and 1989 panels were discontinued early as part of the Census Bureau’s preparations for the
1990 SIPP which was larger and required more resources. See Appendix A of the 1991 (second edition) of the
SIPP User’s Guide.
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were used and sample members were required to be between the ages of 21 to 55 and have a
valid interview for all waves. Since Medicaid eligibility is dependent on the individual’s state
of residence, I only included individuals who lived in one of the uniquely identifiable states for
all waves. I also excluded individuals who moved between states more than once, since those
moving frequently were probably different in important ways from other sample members (they
comprise only a very small portion of the SIPP sample). Individuals who reported receiving SSI
were dropped since they likely had a disability that drastically alters labor force attachment.
Individuals with jobs were only included in my samples if they reported holding one job only
at the end of a given wave and at the beginning of the next wave. The reason for requiring the
individual to have only one job is that the SIPP survey did not observe which employer provided
the respondent’s ECHI explicitly. If a worker reported working two jobs simultaneously, it is
not clear which provided the insurance coverage.12 Considering only workers with one job helps
eliminate this ambiguity. This is also the motivation for requiring the report of one job at the
beginning of the next wave. Since I observe state transitions in the wave following the one in
which I observe ECHI status, requiring one job at the start of the following wave helps identify
if the transition came from a job with ECHI or not.13
The job lock and job push samples are differentiated as already described above in Sections
3.1 and 3.2. Two additional restrictions were also made for estimation reasons: I excluded
potential sample members who would only be observed in the sample one time (so that person
fixed effects could be estimated) and dropped respondents with zero panel weights.
4.1 Imputation of Medicaid eligibility
One of the prerequisites to implementing the analyses described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 is that
Medicaid eligibility must be observed for sample members. While the SIPP questionnaire does
ask respondents about Medicaid enrollment, it does not explicitly observe eligibility for those
not actually enrolled. This issue was previously addressed by authors working in different
contexts, though. For my analysis, I follow Currie and Gruber (1996a,b), Cutler and Gruber
(1996), Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), and Gruber and Simon (2008)14 and impute Medicaid
12The SIPP collected information on up to two jobs (plus self-employment, if any).
13This step of requiring only one job at the start of the current wave would not be necessary in more recent
panels of the SIPP since employer ID numbers are consistent across waves. During the 1980s, however, this
was not the case (Stinson, 2003). This step does have the benefit, though, of providing a check of the worker’s
survey responses. Since the end of a wave and beginning of the next are supposed to be the same time period,
it shows that the respondent is providing employment status consistently for the same point in time at two
separate interviews.
14As a literature, this series of papers presents a very interesting analysis of the Medicaid expansion, and il-
lustrates how government programs have both positive and negative consequences. Currie and Gruber (1996a,b)
both focused on the positive effects of the expansion, arguing that it was responsible for the increased utilization
of health care and a reduction in child and infant mortality and a lower incidence of low birth weights. Cutler
and Gruber (1996) and Gruber and Simon (2008) focused on the arguably negative outcome that the expansion
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eligibility on the basis of observable data and detailed, state-level eligibility rules. I rely on
the programs developed and used by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) to impute eligibility for my
study since their analysis used the SIPP during the same time period I use.15 In my data, I
code individuals as Medicaid eligible if they are imputed as eligible by the Gruber and Yelowitz
program or are reported as actually enrolled in Medicaid by the SIPP survey.16
I impute eligibility for children in the households of the workers up to and inclusive of age
20, the highest possible age a person could be eligible as a child.17 For women in the households
of the workers, I follow Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) and I impute pregnancy eligibility for the
child bearing ages of 15 through 44. For women 45 and older, this implies an assumption that
there is no value for Medicaid pregnancy eligibility for women 45 and older. To the extent that
women above 44 do not expect to have pregnancy expenses, this is a reasonable assumption.
For women from ages 15 through 20, I code the variable Mit equal to one if they are eligible
either as a child or for pregnancy coverage.
5 Results
Tables 5 through 7 contain my main regression results, which are presented separately for
job lock and job push. It should be noted that all estimates are multiplied by 100 and all
models included individual-level fixed effects and year-month dummies. Each table contains
estimates based on three samples: the full sample; one restricted to individuals who were
married each time they were observed in the data; and one restricted to married people and
excluding observations of individuals with household income or job earnings in the top decile.
The marriage restriction has been common in the job lock literature given that dual insurance
coverage is most likely among married couples. My models also involve children, providing
additional reason to examine the results for married people. The most important reason for the
top income exclusion is that such individuals are unlikely to be Medicaid eligible. Additionally,
since incomes are top coded in the SIPP, there is potentially a very large range of incomes in
the top decile. Lastly, it was previously argued by Hamersma and Kim (2009) that those with
appears to have induced eligible individuals to substitute out of private health insurance into public health
insurance. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) likewise focus on an arguably negative consequence by suggesting that
Medicaid eligibility was associated with reduced saving and increased consumption.
15The eligibility imputation programs developed by Gruber and Yelowitz were obtained from Professor
Yelowitz.
16This includes coding men as Medicaid eligible if they are reported as receiving Medicaid benefits in the
SIPP.
17Eligibility for older children came through the “Ribicoff Children” program (Congressional Research Ser-
vice, 1988). Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) only imputed child eligibility through age 18 for their analysis. This
was the only change I made in using their imputation programs.
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high incomes are unlikely to be affected by job lock.18
5.1 Job lock
Table 5 presents my estimates of equation 3.2 for my job lock sample, where the dependent
variable is voluntary job exits. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the full sample, with the
difference between the two being that column (2) includes state-by-year interaction dummies
in the model. For column (1), the job lock estimate given by the preferred estimator, λˆ1 (the
negative of the β5 coefficient), is 0.49, while the alternative estimator, λˆ1 (β4 coefficient), is
similar at 0.46. Given the statistical model that generated them, the interpretation of these
estimates is that an additional household member eligible for Medicaid results in an increase
in the likelihood of the worker leaving his job in the next four months by just under half a
probability point (that is, the change in probability times 100). However, neither estimate is
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Despite that, the estimates are large
when compared to the voluntary exit rate of 1.7% for men in households where all members are
dependent on his ECHI for coverage, as they both would imply an increase of more than 27%.
Estimates from the model including state-by-year dummies in column (2) produce estimates
that are numerically similar and also not statistically significant.
Turning next to estimates on the sample restricted to married workers, found in columns (3)
and (4), we see that λˆ1 produces estimates that are slightly larger than for the full sample, while
λˆ2 produces estimates that are more than twice the magnitude of the full sample. Only one
estimate, from λˆ1 and the model without state-by-year interactions, is statistically significant
(at the 10% significance level), with a point estimate of 0.57 – implying an exit rate increase
of approximately 34%.
When the sample is further restricted to exclude those waves when the worker had incomes
in the top decile, as in columns (5) and (6), the estimates produced by λˆ1 are much larger at 1.2
and 1.1 probability points, respectively. Both of these estimates are statistically significant at
the 1% level, with the 1.2 estimate in column (5) implying an exit rate increase of almost 71%
and the 1.1 figure in column (6) implying a nearly 65% increase. The estimates produced by the
alternative estimator, λˆ2, are very similar to those produced by the sample that includes the
top incomes: their magnitudes are large, both suggesting job mobility increases of more than
45%, but neither is estimated precisely enough to be statistically significant at conventional
levels.
There are two points worth noticing regarding the table as a whole. First, the various esti-
mates are relatively similar across estimators (preferred and alternative), samples, and models,
18There is some reason to doubt this argument, though, given the tax-free nature of ECHI. As income
increases, the tax benefit becomes larger, suggesting a greater importance of ECHI as a job benefit for higher
income workers.
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and all generally tell the same story, even though they are not estimated with enough precision
for most of them to be statistically significant. Secondly, the largest point estimates come from
the samples that exclude workers with top incomes, a result that is consistent with the argu-
ment made by Hamersma and Kim (2009), suggesting those workers should not be affected by
job lock.
Table 6 presents a supplementary set of regressions on a placebo outcome, involuntary
terminations (which was previously used by Hamersma and Kim, 2009). Here, the dependent
variable is equal to one if the worker reports being laid-off or discharged over the next four
months, and zero otherwise. One of the key arguments behind job lock is that the worker chooses
to stay in his job to retain access to health insurance. The worker’s choice is irrelevant though if
the employer terminates the worker. Thus, we would not expect a job lock effect on involuntary
terminations. However, using them for a placebo test is informative because it helps determine
if unobserved trends or factors are biasing the results for voluntary terminations. For example,
suppose the economy worsened causing employers to lay off and reduce hours for many workers.
As a result, Medicaid eligibility might be correlated with the economic downturn (because of
the hours reductions). If workers often report to survey takers that they quit when they were
actually laid off (perhaps out of embarrassment), then the result would be a spurious positive
estimate of job lock when using voluntary terminations as the outcome variable. However, a
positive result would also be found when involuntary terminations was used as well (assuming
some survey respondents tell the truth), meaning such a regression could be used to search for
this sort of problem. Examining the estimates in Table 6 from these placebo regressions, there
is not any apparent source of bias that could also affect the main results in Table 5. I find
all are comparatively small in magnitude and are not statistically significant at conventional
levels, even though standard errors are similar (or smaller) to those found in the voluntary exit
regressions.
5.2 Job push
Results for my job push analysis can be found in Table 7. Here the econometric model is
given by equation 3.7 and the dependent variable is moves to jobs with ECHI. Because of the
redefinition of the ECHI and Medicaid eligibility variables, the signs of the coefficients that are
consistent with job push effects are the same as they were in the job lock regressions: negative
δ5 and positive δ4. For the full job push sample and the model without state-by-year dummies,
column (1), the preferred estimator, pˆi1 (the negative of the δ5 coefficient), produces a job push
estimate of 0.47, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. This means that an
additional household member eligible for Medicaid appears to decrease the worker’s likelihood
of moving to a job with ECHI by a little less than half a percentage point. In my job push
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sample, for households where all members are without health insurance, men transition into
jobs with ECHI over four month periods at an overall rate of 1.8%. Based on this benchmark,
the estimate of 0.47 implies that eligibility decreases job push by 26%. The second job push
estimator, pˆi2 (the δ4 coefficient), produces a much larger estimate of 1.2 percentage points – a
job push decrease of almost 67%. Column (2) shows that the addition of state-by-year dummies
to the econometric model makes little difference in the estimates.
Turning to the sample of married workers, column (3) shows that pˆi1 produces an estimate
of 0.29, which is significant at the ten percent level. This estimate implies a job push decrease
of 16%. The alternative estimator, pˆi2, estimates job push at 0.97 (significant at one percent),
a 54% decrease. Adding state-by-year dummies again makes little difference on the estimates:
0.30 (significant at ten percent, a 17% decrease) from pˆi1 and 1.0 (significant at one percent,
a 56% decrease) from pˆi2. It is noticeable that the estimates from pˆi1 in columns (3) and (4)
are smaller than those in columns (1) and (2), though if there were no change in the standard
errors, the estimates in columns (3) and (4) would be significant at the five percent level.
Dropping the top income individuals from the sample, as in columns (5) and (6), results
in estimates that are nearly identical to those with the high earners. The main difference is a
slight loss in precision from the loss of observations. Because of this, the estimates produced
by pˆi1 are not statistically significant, despite being same as the corresponding estimates in
columns (3) and (4).19
5.3 Estimates using a state-level measure of eligibility
Despite that my regression models include several features intended to minimize bias due to
endogeneity, there still might be concern about my estimates due to the fact that Medicaid
eligibility can be chosen by an individual by working fewer hours or choosing a job that pays
less. Perhaps more importantly, there is also concern that imputed Medicaid eligibility might
be measured with error, something for which I have not yet made any attempt to compensate.
Since imputed eligibility relies on the measurement of individual characteristics via the SIPP, if
those characteristics are mis-measured in the survey, the resulting imputation would also contain
error. Moreover, this mis-measurement could be compounded due to the use of individual-level
fixed effects.
To address both of these issues, I calculate a state-level measure of the generosity of Medicaid
eligibility rules, and use it to replace individual-level eligibility in my regressions. Here state-
19I note here that I do not present any placebo regressions for my job push analysis as there are no appropriate
outcomes available. A valid placebo dependent variable would have to be something similar to transitions into
jobs with ECHI, but where it is clear that eligibility for Medicaid would have no influence. In the job lock case,
I relied on the fact that involuntary terminations are the employer’s choice, not the employee. An analogous
outcome in the job push case would require the observation of situations where an individual did not choose to
transition into a job – but did anyway. Obviously such situations do not exist.
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level generosity is measured by the probability of eligibility in a given state conditional on
individual-level characteristics that are more convincingly exogenous. This is essentially the
strategy relied upon by Currie and Gruber (1996a), Currie and Gruber (1996b), Cutler and
Gruber (1996), Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005), and Gruber and
Simon (2008), who were all working in other research areas; Dave et al. (2013), who studied
crowd-out and, to a lesser-extent, job push; and has similarities to the approach of Hamersma
and Kim (2009) in the job lock literature.
In my job lock models, I indicate the probability of eligibility as Iitj (since it was used as
an instrumental variable in most of the previous literature). The value of Iitj varies on the
state of residence, time (quarter), age, and education level (for kids, education level is based
on household adults). Before describing the calculation of Iitj more carefully, the basic idea
is to start with a static, national sample – static to eliminate the possibility of time trends in
population characteristics, national to remove state-specific characteristics – and calculate the
eligibility of the whole population as if they all lived in a given state, regardless of where the
people actually lived. The probability of eligibility, then, is taken as the fraction of eligible
individuals in this sample within the state, time, age, and education level categories.
The advantage of this strategy is that this state-level measure of eligibility no longer de-
pends on characteristics that are often changed by the individual (state and education can
vary in concept but seldom do for working age adults), and so it reduces the threat of en-
dogeneity. Additionally, since the state-level calculation is based on the imputed eligibility
for many individuals, the impact of mis-measurement for individuals plays a lesser role. The
problem is transformed from one of measuring eligibility for particular individuals to one of
measuring the policies of a state – which a fundamentally easier task. Thus, we would expect
the errors-in-variables problem to be reduced by this approach. The major caveat, though, is
that this approach will not address any mis-measurement introduced by errors in the Medicaid
imputation program itself.20
The calculation of Iitj starts with the entire first wave sample from the 1990 panel of the
SIPP, which has the largest sample size of any wave in my data. For each state and each
quarter in my panel, I impute eligibility for almost all individuals in the sample as if they were
residents of the state in the given quarter. I write almost because no individuals were used in
the calculation of the eligibility probability for the state in which they were actual residents
during the first wave of the 1990 panel. So the measure of state-level eligibility is, in a sense,
a type of “leave-one-out estimator”. This is intended to reduce the influence of state-specific
population characteristics on the calculation of Iitj (and follows the method used by Ham and
Shore-Sheppard, 2005). I adjust incomes used in the imputation process for inflation using the
20Currie and Gruber (1996a), Currie and Gruber (1996b), and Cutler and Gruber (1996) have more extensive
discussion about the exogeneity and measurement error characteristics of Iitj .
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Consumer Price Index (so dollar amounts reflect prices prevailing during the given quarter, not
1990), but all the other characteristics of the individuals in the first-wave of the 1990 panel are
fixed as they were at that time.
Once this eligibility imputation process is complete, I compute the weighted average of
imputed eligibility (using the SIPP final person weights) within the state, quarter, age, and
education level categories. For children, there is a separate age category for each year from
age zero through 20. The education level is taken as the highest education level of adults 18
years or older in the household (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, or
four years of college or more). If there are no adults in the household, then the education level
of the child him- or herself is used.21 For women aged 15 or older, the education level of the
woman herself is used, and age groups are one for each year for those 22 or younger, and then
two-year groups for those 23 and older. The full interaction of these age and education levels
along with the state and quarter variables creates the average eligibility categories – with one
important exception: education level is not used in creating the categories for women 22 or
younger. The reason for this is that many people are still in the process of determining their
final education level at that age. So instead of interacting age with education level, I used a
different age category for each year. After 22, the age categories are two-year groups to ensure
enough individuals in each age-by-education category. Finally, since that women age 15 through
20 could be eligible for Medicaid either as a child or for pregnancy coverage, for women in this
age range I use the greater of the two probabilities as their state-level measures of eligibility.
Given this calculation of Iitj, it replaces Mitj in the models used to estimate job lock and
job push above. For job lock, the model becomes
Yi(t+1) = β1
(
Jit∑
j=1
Eitj
)
+ β2
(
Jit∑
j=1
Iitj
)
+ β3
(
Jit∑
j=1
EitjNitj
)
+ β4
(
Jit∑
j=1
EitjIitj
)
+ β5
(
Jit∑
j=1
EitjNitjIitj
)
+X ′itγ + uit. (5.1)
21Note that in this discussion I am dealing with nearly the entire SIPP sample – not the sample used in my
analysis. My analysis is performed on households with at least one male adult, but my calculation of state-wide
eligibility includes individuals all types of households, such as those with without any male adults, or even any
adults at all, in some cases. This is necessary to calculate eligibility rates for children and women who might
be household members of the workers I study.
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For job push, after defining I˜itj = 1− Iitj and replacing M˜itj, the model becomes
Zi(t+1) = δ1
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itj
)
+ δ2
(
Jit∑
j=1
I˜itj
)
+ δ3
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itjNitj
)
+ δ4
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itj I˜itj
)
+ δ5
(
Jit∑
j=1
E˜itjNitj I˜itj
)
+X ′itθ + εit. (5.2)
These models are then estimated on the same samples as the individual-level eligibility models.
In interpreting the results of the state-level measure models above, the focus should be on
whether they tell the same story as the main regressions in terms of the signs and magnitudes
of the point estimates. If endogeneity and measurement error are truly problems that cause
faulty conclusions, then the coefficient estimates should be drastically different when using the
state-level measure that is thought to suffer less from these problems. Whether or not the state-
level estimates are statistically significant, however, should be viewed as less important because
state-level measures vary less than individual-level measures, resulting in estimates that are less
precise. This is acceptable for the purposes of this analysis, though, because the problems of
endogeneity and measurement error are ones that cause inconsistency of coefficient estimates,
not standard errors that are too small. Thus, if the state-level results tell the same story as
the individual-level results – whether they are statistically significant or not – this should give
us confidence that the individual-level estimates are not suffering from inconsistency and can
therefore be viewed to be as credible as the state-level estimates. If that is the case, then
the appropriate estimates are the individual-level results, which are more precise by nature,
since the issue of ECHI effects on job mobility is one of individual-level insurance coverage
on individual-level behavior. Therefore, the state-level results are intended to be viewed as
robustness-checks on the individual-level results, rather than primary analyses of their own.
Table 8 reports estimates for equations 5.1 and 5.2. The top panel presents the job lock
figures, which are substantially consistent with the individual-level results. In nearly all cases,
the estimates have signs that are predicted by the job lock theory. The exceptions are the figures
from the alternative estimator, pˆi1, on the married, excluding top incomes sample (which, it is
worth noting, have significantly larger standard errors than estimates from the other samples).
Somewhat surprisingly considering the fact that the state-level data has less variation, the
state-level results share the same pattern of statistical significance across estimates as the
individual-level estimates. Turning to the bottom panel of Table 8, which presents estimates
using the job push sample, there is again a high degree of consistency between these results
and the individual-level ones. In this case, all estimates have the sign predicted by the job
push theory, and this analysis again shares the same pattern of statistical significance across
estimates as the individual-level analysis had.
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Taken as a whole, then, this analysis based on state-level eligibility is inconsistent with
the argument that the main, individual-level estimates are severely affected by endogeneity or
measurement error biases. Given this, and viewing this analysis as a robustness check of the
main results, it supports the credibility of the main results.
6 Conclusion
The results of my analysis suggest that there were large job mobility effects arising from the
relationship between health insurance and employment in the USA during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. For job lock, the largest effects are estimated on my sample of married workers
without incomes in the top decile. For these individuals, I find increases in job exit rates in
the range of 65% to 71% over four month periods for each household member who became
Medicaid eligible. Estimates from other samples are similar in that they have magnitudes that
are relatively large, though usually not statistically significant at conventional levels. Similarly,
for job push, I also find evidence of large effects. For the full sample, the preferred estimator
suggests Medicaid eligibility for one household member decreases transitions into jobs with
ECHI by about 26% to 28%. Once again, similar results are obtained across the other samples
as well, though these job push estimates tend to be more precisely estimated than the job
lock ones, resulting in most being statistically significant. Moreover, for both job lock and
job push, when individual-level Medicaid eligibility is replaced in my econometric models with
a state-level measure to address endogeneity and measurement error, very similar results are
obtained.
It should be noted that my estimates, though they are already relatively large, possibly
understate true job mobility effects because there were undoubtedly some number of workers
that were not aware of their Medicaid eligibility, and hence would not have behaved as if they
were insured. My estimates, therefore, represent an average of effects between those who felt
no change in their reliance on their jobs for health insurance – presumably a zero effect – and
those who did. The effect for the true population of interest – those who were aware of their
eligibility – would thus apparently be larger than the effects I estimate.
Another point that should be made here is that the effects measured in this analysis originate
from Medicaid eligibility of household members of workers – not from coverage for workers
themselves. This underscores the importance household members play in workers’ job mobility
decisions, and this paper is the first to study such effects in a job lock or job push context. The
question of whether effects for a worker’s own coverage would be larger or smaller is unanswered,
though, and is deserving of future research.
In considering the implications of my results for the job market, it should not be overlooked
that although my estimates are large in a relative sense, they are small in an absolute sense.
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For example, in the case of job lock, the benchmark job exit rate I use is 1.7%. The largest
job lock estimate in my analysis implied one additional household member becoming Medicaid
eligible would cause this rate to rise to 2.9%, implying that the worker would not exit his
job more than 97% of the time over a four month period. This means that, were government
insurance to be provided to a large portion of the labor market, we should not expect to observe
transformative effects over the short run. The question as to whether small short run effects
could have cumulative impact over the long run is left unanswered by my analysis, though, due
to the short run nature of my data. That said, a sensible argument could be made that a long
run impact would not be surprising: small, short run effects accrue over the course of a career
and result in missed opportunities to develop skills and accumulate human capital, resulting
in diminished earnings potential over the long run. The empirical validity of this argument is
another open question worthy of future research.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that my job lock results for married workers provide some
validation of Madrian (1994) in relation to the critiques levied by Kapur (1997). Madrian
was the first to use a DD approach to estimate job lock, and estimated that ECHI caused a
reduction in job exit probability for married men ranging from 25% to 70%. Kapur argued
that Madrian’s DD control and treatment groups were too dissimilar to be comparable, and
used a refined DD approach that improved in this dimension. She then based identification
on variation in an index of survey reported health issues, and found no job lock effects while
using the same data as Madrian. My analysis, however, addresses Kapur’s critique, since my
primary control group is similar to hers, while also improving on her analysis by using Medicaid
eligibility as the identification method. This is an improvement because the survey reported
health conditions she used may not actually generate significant variation in dependence on
employment for health insurance. The sorts of health conditions reported to surveys would
tend to be chronic and easily observable, which may be important predictors for some types
of future health care spending, but they would not necessarily predict individual valuation
of coverage for unexpected and catastrophic health issues. Thus, individuals not reporting
health conditions to surveys may have just as strong demand for ECHI as individuals who do.
Medicaid, however, is actual insurance coverage and does cover unexpected and catastrophic
expenses, in addition to chronic issues, making it a more plausible source of variation in the
dependence on employment for health insurance. With this improved approach, and using data
from the same time period as these authors, my estimates are similar to Madrian’s, suggesting
that Kapur’s result may be a due to a lack of variation in the demand for insurance, rather
than a lack of a true job lock effect.
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Table 1: Nationwide Medicaid eligibility over time
Fraction of population
Children Women
Year (under 21) (21 or over)
1986 0.210 0.105
1987 0.220 0.106
1988 0.211 0.113
1989 0.222 0.139
1990 0.241 0.185
1991 0.295 0.217
1992 0.321 0.240
1993 0.379 0.248
All estimates are calculated for the month of March
(which tends to have large sample sizes due to panel
overlap) of the given year and are weighted using
month-level, individual, cross-sectional weights.
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Table 2: Identification of job lock parameters
Example Model: Yi(t+1) = β1Eit + β2Mit + β3EitNit + β4EitMit + β5EitNitMit + uit
ECHI (Eit) and Non-ECHI (Nit) Insurance Status
Preferred Alternative
Medicaid Treatment Group Control Group Control Group
Eligible? Eit = 1, Nit = 0 Eit = 1, Nit = 1 Eit = 0, Nit = 1
Mit = 1 E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 0,Mit = 1] E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 1,Mit = 1] E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 0, Nit = 1,Mit = 1]
= β1 + β2 + β4 = β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 = β2
Mit = 0 E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 0,Mit = 0] E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 1, Nit = 1,Mit = 0] E[Yi(t+1)|Eit = 0, Nit = 1,Mit = 0]
= β1 = β1 + β3 = 0
Column = β2 + β4 = β2 + β4 + β5 = β2
Difference
Job lock parameter 1: λ1 ≡ β2 + β4 − β2 − β4 − β5 = −β5
Job lock parameter 2: λ2 ≡ β2 + β4 − β2 = β4
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Table 3: Restrictions to the SIPP sample of men (1986 - 1988, 1990, & 1991 panels)
Person -
wave Unique
Sample restrictions records individuals
All month four records, excluding the last interview of each panel* 554,742 104,768
Age 21 to 55 during all waves 259,573 49,541
Valid interview for all panel waves 188,594 30,249
Uniquely identifiable state all waves 179,913 28,851
At most one move between states 178,972 28,700
Not an SSI recipient 176,664 28,334
Job lock sample
All household members have employer provided coverage 114,890 22,667
One job at end of wave and start of next 96,565 19,811
Observed in job lock sample for at least two waves 94,821 18,067
Positive panel weight 94,809 18,064
Job push sample
Sample member does not have ECHI or the entire 71,645 16,291
household has employer coverage from a household
member besides the sample member
No job or one job at end of wave and start of next 67,399 16,022
Observed in job push sample for at least two waves 64,690 13,313
Positive panel weight 64,664 13,309
*Also excludes ten records which did not have an assigned gender in the SIPP longitudinal files.
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Table 4: Sample averages and standard deviations
Figures are presented as percentages (multiplied by 100), except where noted by *
Job lock sample Job push sample
Variable Average Std.Dev. Variable Average Std.Dev.
Quit/retired (Yi(t+1)) 2.160 14.537 Moved to ECHI (Zi(t+1)) 1.713 12.977
Laid-off/fired 1.208 10.923
ECHI 91.922 27.250 ECHI 12.930 33.554
Non-ECHI 18.374 38.728 Non-ECHI 60.320 48.924
Medicaid eligible 0.091 3.022 Medicaid eligible 3.425 18.188∑
j Eitj* 2.558 1.655
∑
j E˜itj* 3.036 1.815∑
jMitj* 0.177 0.605
∑
j M˜itj* 2.802 1.461∑
j EitjNitj* 0.352 0.959
∑
j E˜itjNitj* 1.809 1.758∑
j EitjMitj* 0.142 0.563
∑
j E˜itjM˜itj* 2.456 1.617∑
j EitjNitjMitj* 0.010 0.115
∑
j E˜itjNitjM˜itj* 1.640 1.647∑
j Iitj* 0.420 0.482
∑
j I˜itj* 2.891 1.263∑
j EitjIitj* 0.325 0.461
∑
j E˜itj I˜itj* 2.577 1.490∑
j EitjNitjIitj* 0.046 0.172
∑
j E˜itjNitj I˜itj* 1.586 1.533
Age* 36.810 8.412 Age* 35.713 9.150
Earnings decile* 7.507 2.207 Earnings decile* 5.588 2.727
Household income decile* 6.915 2.265 Household income decile* 5.501 2.951
Married 76.149 42.617 Married 65.295 47.603
Previously married 8.650 28.111 Previously married 9.317 29.067
Never married 15.201 35.903 Never married 25.388 43.523
Less than HS 9.565 29.411 Less than HS 20.088 40.066
High School 35.963 47.989 High School 36.227 48.066
Some college 22.830 41.974 Some college 22.728 41.908
College 31.643 46.508 College 20.957 40.701
Private job 82.426 38.060 Private job 83.666 36.968
Public job 17.574 38.060 Public job 16.334 36.968
Has child under 2 11.754 32.206 Has child under 2 11.814 32.278
Has child 2 to 5 21.857 41.328 Has child 2 to 5 20.501 40.371
Has child 6 to 17 41.237 49.226 Has child 6 to 17 38.592 48.682
Count of HH members* 2.174 1.404 Count of HH members* 2.390 1.558
Observations 94,809 Observations 64,664
All estimates are weighted using panel weights adjusted as described in footnote 9. All control variables were
implemented in regressions as category dummies, but in order to save space here, firm type and marital status
categories have been condensed, and age, earning and income deciles, and counts of household members are
represented as numbers. Complete child age interactions used in the regressions are also not presented for the
same reason.
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Table 5: Job lock results: dependent variable = voluntary job exits
(All estimates multiplied by 100)
Married Only
Excludes
Full Sample Top Incomes
Coefficient – Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 –
∑
j Eitj -0.244
∗ -0.267∗∗ -0.159 -0.155 -0.153 -0.184
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18)
[0.07] [0.04] [0.25] [0.25] [0.41] [0.31]
β2 –
∑
jMitj -0.546 -0.509 -1.051
∗ -1.000∗ -1.015 -0.899
(0.41) (0.43) (0.58) (0.61) (0.66) (0.66)
[0.19] [0.24] [0.07] [0.10] [0.12] [0.17]
β3 –
∑
j EitjNitj 0.056 0.052 0.052 0.031 0.137 0.134
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
[0.62] [0.65] [0.67] [0.81] [0.40] [0.45]
β4 –
∑
j EitjMitj (λˆ2 estimator) 0.463 0.425 0.908 0.882 0.878 0.777
(0.44) (0.46) (0.57) (0.60) (0.65) (0.66)
[0.29] [0.35] [0.11] [0.14] [0.18] [0.24]
β5 –
∑
j EitjNitjMitj (−λˆ1 estimator) -0.485 -0.458 -0.566∗ -0.492 -1.212∗∗∗ -1.089∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.34) (0.30) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38)
[0.12] [0.17] [0.06] [0.16] [0.00] [0.00]
Person-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 94,809 94,809 70,252 70,252 49,359 49,359
Estimates are weighted using panel weights adjusted as described in footnote 9. Two-way-clustered standard
errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Statistical significance for two-sided t-tests indicated by ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Both cluster variables indicate state of residence, and can be different for movers.
See Section 3.3 for details. Samples for Columns (3) through (6) include only those who were married every time
they were observed. Columns (5) and (6) also exclude any observations for individuals with either job earnings
or household income in the top decile. Additional, unlisted control variables include dummies for: child age
(indicators for a child under two, two through five, and six through 17, and these are fully interacted); education
(less than high school, high school diploma, some college, and four years of college or more); marital status
(married – spouse present, married – spouse absent, widowed, divorced, separated, never married); five-year-age
group, meaning 21-24, 25-29, 30-34, and so on; job earnings and household earnings deciles; firm type (not
working, private, non-profit, federal, state , or local government, armed forces, or unpaid family business or
farm); and number of household members, with five or more treated as one group.
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Table 6: Job lock results: dependent variable = involuntary job exits (placebo outcome)
(All estimates multiplied by 100)
Married Only
Excludes
Full Sample Top Incomes
Coefficient – Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β1 –
∑
j Eitj 0.386
∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.378∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
[0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05]
β2 –
∑
jMitj -0.195 -0.183 -0.428 -0.404 -0.523 -0.489
(0.36) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.38)
[0.59] [0.62] [0.28] [0.31] [0.15] [0.20]
β3 –
∑
j EitjNitj -0.076 -0.087 -0.058 -0.064 -0.084 -0.090
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
[0.18] [0.12] [0.34] [0.28] [0.32] [0.27]
β4 –
∑
j EitjMitj (λˆ2 estimator) -0.093 -0.098 0.231 0.214 0.332 0.312
(0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36)
[0.80] [0.79] [0.53] [0.56] [0.35] [0.39]
β5 –
∑
j EitjNitjMitj (−λˆ1 estimator) -0.167 -0.168 -0.195 -0.230 -0.337 -0.384
(0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.41) (0.40)
[0.62] [0.62] [0.55] [0.48] [0.41] [0.34]
Person-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 94,809 94,809 70,252 70,252 49,359 49,359
Estimates are weighted using panel weights adjusted as described in footnote 9. Two-way-clustered standard
errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Statistical significance for two-sided t-tests indicated by ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Both cluster variables indicate state of residence, and can be different for movers.
See Section 3.3 for details. Samples for Columns (3) through (6) include only those who were married every
time they were observed. Columns (5) and (6) also exclude any observations for individuals with either job
earnings or household income in the top decile. Additional, unlisted control variables include dummies for:
child age (indicators for a child under two, two through five, and six through 17, and these are fully interacted);
education (less than high school, high school diploma, some college, and four years of college or more); marital
status (married – spouse present, married – spouse absent, widowed, divorced, separated, never married); five-
year-age group, meaning 21-24, 25-29, 30-34, and so on; job earnings and household earnings deciles; firm type
(not working, private, non-profit, federal, state , or local government, armed forces, or unpaid family business
or farm); and number of household members, with five or more treated as one group.
35
Table 7: Job push results: dependent variable = moves to ECHI jobs
(All estimates multiplied by 100)
Married Only
Excludes
Full Sample Top Incomes
Coefficient – Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ1 –
∑
j E˜itj 0.313 0.299 0.327 0.295 0.408 0.401
(0.24) (0.24) (0.35) (0.33) (0.39) (0.37)
[0.19] [0.22] [0.35] [0.37] [0.30] [0.28]
δ2 –
∑
j M˜itj -0.980
∗∗∗ -1.016∗∗∗ -0.705∗∗∗ -0.753∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗ -0.747∗∗
(0.29) (0.30) (0.26) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.03] [0.02]
δ3 –
∑
j E˜itjNitj -0.156 -0.135 -0.265 -0.261 -0.252 -0.247
(0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
[0.32] [0.37] [0.21] [0.21] [0.26] [0.26]
δ4 –
∑
j E˜itjM˜itj (pˆi2 estimator) 1.165
∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
δ5 –
∑
j E˜itjNitjM˜itj (−pˆi1 estimator) -0.467∗∗∗ -0.506∗∗∗ -0.294∗ -0.303∗ -0.294 -0.303
(0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.09] [0.13] [0.13]
Person-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 64,664 64,664 42,347 42,347 35,424 35,424
Estimates are weighted using panel weights adjusted as described in footnote 9. Two-way-clustered standard errors
in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Statistical significance for two-sided t-tests indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Both cluster variables indicate state of residence, and can be different for movers. See Section 3.3
for details. Samples for Columns (3) through (6) include only those who were married every time they were observed.
Columns (5) and (6) also exclude any observations for individuals with either job earnings or household income in the
top decile. Additional, unlisted control variables include dummies for: child age (indicators for a child under two, two
through five, and six through 17, and these are fully interacted); education (less than high school, high school diploma,
some college, and four years of college or more); marital status (married – spouse present, married – spouse absent,
widowed, divorced, separated, never married); five-year-age group, meaning 21-24, 25-29, 30-34, and so on; job earnings
and household earnings deciles; firm type (not working, private, non-profit, federal, state , or local government, armed
forces, or unpaid family business or farm); and number of household members, with five or more treated as one group.
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Table 8: Estimates using a state-level measure of eligibility (estimates multiplied by 100)
JOB LOCK: dependent variable = voluntary job exits
Married Only
Excludes
Full Sample Top Incomes
Coefficient – Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β4 –
∑
j EitjIitj (λˆ2 estimator) 0.922 0.680 0.653 0.562 -0.220 -0.151
(0.67) (0.64) (0.67) (0.63) (0.85) (0.84)
[0.17] [0.29] [0.33] [0.38] [0.80] [0.86]
β5 –
∑
j EitjNitjIitj (−λˆ1 estimator) -0.361 -0.294 -1.082∗ -0.910 -1.544∗∗ -1.371∗
(0.59) (0.60) (0.62) (0.65) (0.75) (0.83)
[0.54] [0.63] [0.08] [0.16] [0.04] [0.10]
Person-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 94,809 94,809 70,252 70,252 49,359 49,359
JOB PUSH: dependent variable = moves to ECHI jobs
Married Only
Excludes
Full Sample Top Incomes
Coefficient – Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
δ4 –
∑
j E˜itj I˜itj (pˆi2 estimator) 1.704
∗∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗ 1.663∗∗∗ 1.710∗∗∗ 1.645∗∗
(0.49) (0.55) (0.55) (0.62) (0.66) (0.77)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03]
δ5 –
∑
j E˜itjNitj I˜itj (−pˆi1 estimator) -0.993∗∗∗ -1.060∗∗∗ -0.770∗∗ -0.834∗∗ -0.711 -0.780
(0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.41) (0.45) (0.47)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.04] [0.04] [0.11] [0.10]
Person-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 64,664 64,664 42,347 42,347 35,424 35,424
Two-way-clustered standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets. Statistical significance for two-sided t-tests
indicated by ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All models are the same as in Tables 5 and 7, except the
Medicaid eligibility indicator variable has been replaced with a state-level measure of eligibility, I, as described in
Section 5.3. See notes for Tables 5 or 7 for model and standard error details.
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Appendix A
To show that link between the simple version of my job lock model (equation 3.3) and the full,
empirical model (equation 3.2), I start with the following, hypothetical regression:
Yi(t+1) = β11Eit1 + β21Mit1 + β31Eit1Nit1 + β41Eit1Mit1 + β51Eit1Nit1Mit1
+ β12Eit2 + β22Mit2 + β32Eit2Nit2 + β42Eit2Mit2 + β52Eit2Nit2Mit2
. . .
+ β1JitEitJit + β2JitMitJit + β3JitEitJitNitJit + β4JitEitJitMitJit + β5JitEitJitNitJitMitJit
+X ′itγ + uit. (A.1)
In this model, everyone in the household has his or her own dual DD model (each on a separate
line above) that produces two individualized estimates of his or her effect on the worker’s job
leaving rate. That is, two estimates of λ would be generated for each person in the household,
and each person’s estimates could be different from all others. This specification is flexible, but
implementation would be difficult, as would be interpretation, since it would depend on how
household members are indexed across households. To address this, I make the assumption that
each of the Jit people in the household carry the same weight in determining the worker’s job
leaving behavior. This assumption implies, for example, that a father does not care more about
his wife losing insurance coverage than his child, but wants both to have it and acts equally in
response to both of their insurance statuses. To implement this assumption, I restrict all the
coefficients on corresponding insurance status variables to be equal across individuals in the
household: βhj = βh for all j and h = 1, 2, . . . 5. Given this assumption, equation A.1 collapses
to the model I use in my analysis, equation 3.2.
The interpretation of the coefficients for the full model can be shown by adapting the
argument used to derive the interpretation of the simple model parameters. Start by adapting
the definition of λ1 for the full econometric model:
λ1 ≡ E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 0,Mitj = 1]− E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 0,Mitj = 0]
− (E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 1,Mitj = 1]− E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 1,Mitj = 0]) . (A.2)
Note that each of these expectations also conditions on the other control variables, X, and
the insurance status variables for the other household members besides j, but I suppress them
here to simplify the notation. Next, define five variables, e, m, en, em, and enm, such that
if Eitj = 1, Nitj = 0, and Mitj = 0, then
∑
j Eitj = e,
∑
jMitj = m,
∑
j EitjNitj = en,∑
j EitjMitj = em, and
∑
j EitjNitjMitj = enm.
Using the above defined variables, it is possible to write the conditional expectations in
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equation A.2 as follows:
E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 0,Mitj = 1] =
β1e+ β2(m+ 1) + β3en+ β4(em+ 1) + β5enm+X
′
itγ
E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 0,Mitj = 0] = β1e + β2m + β3en + β4em + β5enm + X ′itγ
E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 1,Mitj = 1] =
β1e+ β2(m+ 1) + β3(en+ 1) + β4(em+ 1) + β5(enm+ 1) +X
′
itγ
E[Yi(t+1)|Eitj = 1, Nitj = 1,Mitj = 0] = β1e + β2m + β3(en + 1) + β4em + β5enm + X ′itγ.
These conditional expectations can then be substituted into equation A.2 to show that λ1 =
−β5.
The same approach can be used to show that λ2 = β4 in the full model, and that the
corresponding relationships hold for the job push model, as well.
Appendix B
To show that including transitions into jobs without ECHI in the outcome variable for a job
push analysis leads to bias, I begin by defining two additional variables, W and V , to supplement
the already defined Z (dropping subscripts that are unnecessary for this discussion). W = 1 if
the worker moves into a job without ECHI, and W = 0 otherwise, and V ≡ Z + W – that is,
V = 1 indicates movement into any job, and V = 0 otherwise. A job push analysis using V as
the outcome of interest would identify
E[V |seeking ECHI]− E[V |not seeking ECHI].
Substitution for V allows this to be decomposed into a job push effect plus a bias term
E[V |seeking ECHI]− E[V |not seeking ECHI] =
E[Z|seeking ECHI]− E[Z|not seeking ECHI]+
E[W |seeking ECHI]− E[W |not seeking ECHI] =
pi + E[W |seeking ECHI]− E[W |not seeking ECHI].
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If there is a true job push effect, then we would not expect the underlined bias term to equal
zero. We would expect the likelihood of moving into a job without ECHI for someone seeking
ECHI to be less than that likelihood if that person were not seeking ECHI. Hence, we would
expect the underlined term to be negative.
Appendix C
As I did in discussing the interpretation of the job lock model, I consider a simple version of
the full empirical model for my job push analysis, hoping that this will make the rationale more
transparent. This simple model is given by
Zi(t+1) = δ1E˜it + δ2M˜it + δ3E˜itNit + δ4E˜itM˜it + δ5E˜itNitM˜it +X
′
itθ + εit, (C.1)
where the j index has been omitted since here I focus on the worker only. This model can be
used to identify two separate job push parameters in a manner that is analogous to the method
used for the job lock case:
pi1 ≡ E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 0, M˜it = 1]− E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 0, M˜it = 0]
−
(
E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 1, M˜it = 1]− E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 1, M˜it = 0]
)
= −δ5, (C.2)
and
pi2 ≡ E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 0, M˜it = 1]− E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 0, M˜it = 0]
−
(
E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 0, Nit = 1, M˜it = 1]− E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 0, Nit = 1, M˜it = 0]
)
= δ4. (C.3)
The equivalence of these job push parameters to the δ4 and −δ5 parameters of the model is
detailed in Appendix Table C.1, thereby justifying pˆi1 = −δˆ5 and pˆi2 = δˆ4 as DD job push
estimators.
Moving from this simple model to the full, empirical model in equation 3.7 is easily shown
via analogous reasoning as used for the same move from simple to full model in the job lock
case (see Appendix A).
40
Appendix Table C.1: Identification of job push parameters*
Example Model: Zi(t+1) = δ1E˜it + δ2M˜it + δ3E˜itNit + δ4E˜itM˜it + δ5E˜itNitM˜it + εit
ECHI (E˜it) and Non-ECHI (Nit) Insurance Status
Preferred Alternative
Medicaid Treatment Group Control Group Control Group
Eligible? E˜it = 1, Nit = 0 E˜it = 1, Nit = 1 E˜it = 0, Nit = 1
M˜it = 1 E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 0, M˜it = 1] E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 1, M˜it = 1] E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 0, Nit = 1, M˜it = 1]
= δ1 + δ2 + δ4 = δ1 + δ2 + δ3 + δ4 + δ5 = δ2
M˜it = 0 E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 0, M˜it = 0] E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 1, Nit = 1, M˜it = 0] E[Zi(t+1)|E˜it = 0, Nit = 1, M˜it = 0]
= δ1 = δ1 + δ3 = 0
Column = δ2 + δ4 = δ2 + δ4 + δ5 = δ2
Difference
Job push parameter 1: pi1 ≡ δ2 + δ4 − δ2 − δ4 − δ5 = −δ5
Job push parameter 2: pi2 ≡ δ2 + δ4 − δ2 = δ4
*Note that here E˜it = 1 implies no ECHI and M˜it = 1 implies not Medicaid eligible.
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Appendix D
Tables D.1 and D.2 present hypothetical data illustrating creation of the cluster-group variables
for implementation of two-way clustering in my analyses. The use of these variables is described
in Section 3.3 of the text.
Table D.3 summarizes the types of observations that will be allowed to be correlated under
this method. For a given pair of individuals, they are either both stayers, both movers, or there
is one stayer and one mover. Table D.3 divides the observations into these categories and lists
them by whether the individuals have any values in common for either cluster variable. For
those pairs that do have common values for a cluster variable, general forms of correlation are
permitted, while for those with no common values, the correlation is assumed to be zero. As
compared to the alternative of clustering on only one state, this method allows for correlation in
two additional categories that would have been assumed to be zero. These additional categories
of correlation (rows (4) and (8)) are identified in Table D.3 by row shading.
The primary weakness of using this method of clustering is that one could argue that
correlation should be allowed for the categories found in rows (9), (10), and (11), but because
there is no common value between observations for either cluster variable, the correlation is
assumed to be zero. For example, suppose Person One lived in California for waves one through
four then moved to South Carolina, while Person Two lived in South Carolina the first wave
then moved to California for the rest of the panel (i.e. the case found in row (9)). These
two people both lived in California at the same time for three waves, yet their error terms are
assumed uncorrelated. Therefore, to the extent that this type of correlation is truly important
in my sample, my standard error estimators will be inconsistent. However, as compared to
available alternatives, this method would seem to be an improvement.22
22Individuals who move more than once over the course of a panel are not included in my sample (see
Section 4). However, these individuals could be included, in principle, and this method of clustering extended
by creating variables for all of the states where individuals lived and using higher dimension clustering in the
same fashion. The weakness regarding the handling of movers living in a place at the same time but without
common values for any cluster variable would be compounded, though, so this method may not be justified in
some cases.
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Appendix Table D.1: State variable creation example – stayer
Actual
State of
ID Variable Wave Residence First State Second State
101 1 CA CA CA
101 2 CA CA CA
101 3 CA CA CA
101 4 CA CA CA
Example data setup for a hypothetical four-wave panel.
Appendix Table D.2: State variable creation example – mover
Actual
State of
ID Variable Wave Residence First State Second State
101 1 CA CA SC
101 2 CA CA SC
101 3 SC CA SC
101 4 SC CA SC
Example data setup for a hypothetical four-wave panel.
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Appendix Table D.3: Summary of error term correlation assumptions
Person i Person j Correlation
Type of Row First Second First Second Correlation of Zero
Observation Pair Number State State State State Allowed Assumed
Stayer & Stayer
{
(1) h h h h X
(2) h h k k X
Stayer & Mover

(3) h h h k X
(4) h h k h X
(5) h h k m X
Mover & Mover

(6) h k h k X
(7) h k h m X
(8) h k m k X
(9) h k k h X
(10) h k m h X
(11) h k k m X
(12) h k m l X
All regression standard errors are calculated using two-way clustering, which allows for error term corre-
lation structures as summarized above. Letters i and j indicate distinct individuals and h, k, l, and m
represent distinct states of residence. Shaded rows indicate categories of observations in which correlation
is allowed using the two-way-cluster method suggested here, but where correlation would be assumed to
be zero if one were to cluster only on the first state of residence. More detail regarding the calculation of
standard errors can be found in Section 3.3.
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